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LIMITATION OF REMEDIES
SALES - LIMITATION OF REMEDIES - FAILURE OF
ESSENTIAL PURPOSE
Adams v. 1. I. Case Co.,
125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970).
The following has been an inadequately resolved issue concern-
ing the Sales provisions of the Uniform, Commercial Code (UCC):
To what extent are alternative Code remedies available when an
express and exclusive remedy between commercial parties fails in
its essential purpose? A recent decision of an Illinois court of ap-
peals, Adams v. 1. I. Case Co.,' has responded by allowing both
direct and consequential damages for the seller's failure to honor
his express warranty to successfully repair his product within a rea-
sonable time.
Adams, a general contractor, purchased one of the defendant's
tractors for use in his business. According to the plaintiff's com-
plaint, the general nature of the work and the future contracts for
which the vehicle was to be used were made known to the dealer
before the purchase. The plaintiff had purchased several of the de-
fendant manufacturer's tractors similar to the one in question from
the defendant dealer and had never experienced serious difficulties.
The plaintiff alleged that he completely relied upon the skill and
ability of the defendants to produce and service a satisfactory trac-
tor. The written warranty signed by the plaintiff at the time of sale
provided that the manufacturer and dealer would repair or replace
defective parts for 1 year after delivery. The warranty further pro-
vided that it was "in lieu of all other warranties and conditions, ex-
press, implied, or statutory," and it disclaimed liability for conse-
quential damages.'
After using the tractor for 1 month, the plaintiff returned it be-
cause of defects in the radiator and hydraulic system. The defects
were not corrected for 15 months. The plaintiff alleged that dur-
ing that time he lost the contracts for which the tractor was pur-
chased and suffered a loss of reputation. The complaint alleged
liability on five counts, each containing a different basis for recovery.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause
of action. The court of appeals reversed the dismissal of the counts
1125 III. App. 2d 388, 261 NlE.2d 1 (1970).
2Id. at 398-99, 261 N.E.2d at 6.
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alleging breaches of express warranties and affirmed the dismissal of
the counts alleging other bases of liability.'
In reversing the dismissal of the count alleging a breach by the
defendants of their written warranty to repair, the court conceded
that the defendants were permitted by section 2-719(1) (a) of the
UCC to restrict and limit their liability to the repair and replacement
of parts,4 and that such limitation was not unreasonable at the time
of purchase. This limitation became unreasonable, however, be-
cause of the defendants' failure to reasonably comply with the terms
of the express remedy. The defendants' long delay in making the
repairs caused the exclusive remedy to fail in its essential purpose.
At this point in its reasoning, however, the court seemed to fail
to distinguish between the concepts of a warranty given and a rem-
edy for the breach of that warranty. Although the court found that
the defendant breached its express warranty by failing to make the
repairs within a reasonable time, it went on to create an implied
warranty, arising from course of dealing and usage of trade,5 that
the repairs would be reasonably prompt. The court stated that the
plaintiff was protected by this implied warranty because of the
failure of the exclusive remedy in the written agreement. The court
then found that this implied warranty was breached by the seller,
giving rise to the statutory remedies of the UCC.
In finding an implied warranty which was breached, the court
added a step that was both unnecessary and inaccurate. The im-
plied warranty was unnecessary because the breach of the express
warranty and failure of the exclusive, express remedy were sufficient
in themselves to allow damages under the UCC. It was inaccurate
because the disclaimers in the written warranty were controlling.
Section 2-316 of the UCC, which deals with exclusion or modifica-
tion of warranties, does not provide for any restrictions in the limita-
tion or disclaimer of implied warranties arising from course of deal-
ing or usage of trade. Therefore, the disclaimer clause in the written
3 The dismissal of count I, which alleged causes of action in implied warranty, strict
liability for defective manufacturing, and negligence in manufacturing, was affirmed be-
cause it failed to contain complete elements of the causes of action and failed to inform
defendants of a valid claim. The dismissal of count V, which was based on a restim-
tionary theory, was affirmed because of the disclaimer clause of the express warranty.
Counts II, III, and IV are discussed in the text.
4 UCC § 2-719 allows the parties to modify or limit their remedies in a sales con-
tract. Subsection 3 specifically states that "[clonsequential damages may be limited
or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable."
5 UCC § 2-314 (3) provides that "[u]nless excluded or modified .. .other implied
warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade."
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warranty effectively prevented any such implied warranty from
arising.
It is possible that because the repairs were successfully com-
pleted 15 months after they began, the court wanted to find some
basis for the breach in the understandings between the parties when
they entered into the sales contract. When the court found that the
express remedy of repairs failed in its essential purpose, it was find-
ing as a matter of law that the repairs took an unreasonably long
time to complete. The court went on, however, to imply a war-
ranty that the repairs would be reasonably prompt, in order to look
at the past course of dealing between the parties to find a reasonable
time for the repairs. This step was unnecessary. Through the use
of the parole evidence rule, the court could have reached the same
result by engrafting onto the express written remedy for repair the
understanding between the parties that the repairs would be reason-
ably prompt. Section 2-202 of the UCC, which deals with parole
evidence, provides that course of dealing or usage of trade can be
used to explain or supplement what would otherwise be a final writ-
ten expression of the intentions of the parties. Comment 2 of this
section states:
[E]vidence of course of dealing ... [is admissable] to explain or
supplement the terms of any writing stating the agreement of the
parties in order that the true understanding of the parties as to the
agreement may be reached. Such writings are to be read on the
assumption that the course of prior dealings between the parties
... were taken for granted when the document was phrased. Un-
less carefully negated they have become an element of the mean-
ing of the words used.6
Thus, the court did not have to delve into implied warranties
which had been expressly abrogated by the disclaimers - in order
to look to the past dealings of the parties to determine what they
felt would be a reasonably prompt completion of the repairs.
After finding that the exclusive remedy contemplated by the
parties had failed in its essential purpose, the court could have gone
directly to the issue of what alternative general remedy provisions
of the UCC would be available to the plaintiff. Although the UCC
allows the parties freedom to shape their own remedies, it is essen-
tial that the contractual remedies be honored. If the contractual
remedies are not honored, the other remedies provided by the UCC
become applicable as if the limiting clause never existed.7
6 UCC § 2-202, Comment 2.
7 UCC § 2-719(2) states that "[w]here circumstances cause an exclusive or limited
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Under its approach, the Adams court then found that both conse-
quential' and direct damages9 were appropriate remedies under the
UCC. In allowing consequential damages, the court placed weight
on the prior dealings between the buyer and the defendant seller.
The court looked beyond the limitations contemplated by the parties
at the time of sale. It emphasized the dealer's knowledge of the
plaintiff's particular needs, the plaintiff's reliance on the dealer's
judgment, and the dealer's "willfully dilatory or careless and negli-
gent [conduct] in making the corrections or repairs called for in
their warranty"' ° as providing the "special circumstances" required
by the UCC for the recovery of consequential damages."
Turning to the other counts of the complaint, the court affirmed
the dismissal of count IV which, although poorly pleaded, apparent-
ly relied on a theory of breach of the implied warranty of merchant-
ability found in section 2-314 of the UCC.12  This section imposes
a warranty of quality on the seller and sets up broad minimum com-
pliance standards, the most relevant of which provides that the
goods be "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used."' 3 The drafters of the Code clearly intended this warranty to
remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act."
Comment 1 to section 2-719 explains that "where an apparently fair and reasonable
clause because of circumstances ...operates to deprive either party of the substantial
value of the bargain, it must give way to the general remedy provisions of this Article."
See Hawkland, Limitation of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 11 How.
L.J. 28, 42 (1965).
8 Consequential damages are those which do not flow directly from the breach, but
only from some of the consequences or results of the breach. See Redevelopment and
Housing Authority v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 195 Va. 827, 836, 80 S.E.2d 574, 580
(1954); Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854); note 11 infra.
9 UCC § 2-714(2) provides: "The measure of damages for breach of warranty is
the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods ac-
cepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special
circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount."
10 125 Ill. App. 2d at 406, 261 N.E.2d at 9.
11 Generally, consequential damages include any loss resulting from the general or
particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had rea-
son to know, and which could not have been prevented by cover. UCC § 2-715(2).
If proven, most courts will allow claims for loss of working hours, loss of jobs, and cost
of overhauls. See R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715:4 (1961).
Losses of goodwill and future profits, however, have not been allowed because they are
deemed too speculative. See Neville Chemical Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d
1205, 1225-26 (3d Cir. 1970) (a diversity suit following Pennsylvania law); H. Rubin
& Sons v. Consolidated Pipe Co., 396 Pa. 506, 153 A.2d 472 (1959). But see Peters,
Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform
Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE LJ. 199, 276-77 (1963).
12 The complaint alleged that "the tractor was sold with an implied warranty that
the tractor was a good, satisfactory tractor capable of doing the work for which it was
sold .... " 125 Ill. App. 2d at 408, 261 N.E.2d at 10 (emphasis added).
13UCC § 2-314(2) (c).
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be difficult to exclude or modify because it is commonly taken for
granted by the purchaser. 4 Section 2-316(2) of the UCC states
that "to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability
or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and
in the case of a writing must be conspicuous .... " The disclaimer
in the written warranty in Adams was insufficient to prevent the
buyer from receiving the implied warranty of merchantability and
the count of the complaint alleging its breach should have been al-
lowed.
It is possible, however, that because of the poorly pleaded com-
plaint the court thought that the allegations of count IV were based
on the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.15 If
they were so based, the dismissal of the count would have been justi-
fied because the disclaimer in the written agreement was sufficient
to exclude this warranty. The court's opinion, however, explained
only that the implied warranty alleged was expressly bound by the
written disclaimer.
The court reversed the dismissal of count III of the complaint
which was based on breach of an express warranty created by adver-
tising. The plaintiff alleged that this warranty arose because pam-
phlets, circulars, advertisements, and oral statements had expressly
warranted the tractor to be satisfactory for the purpose for which the
buyer would use it.'6 The court found that this was essentially the
same cause of action as the first express warranty claim, but allowed
it in order to permit the plaintiff to prove the additional damages
alleged in this count of the complaint. 17 The court was incorrect,
however, in equating this claim with the breach of the express war-
ranty to repair. The express warranty created by advertising was
one of quality and would have been breached even if the remedy to
repair had not failed.
The result in Adams appears to be correct despite the court's
questionable reasoning. It is unfortunate, however, not only that
the court used the wrong rationale, but that it did not explain its
14 See UCC § 2-314, Comment 11.
15 Thiswarranty is found in section 2-315 of the UCC which states:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless
excluded or modified... an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose.
16 See UCC § 2-313.
17 The plaintiff alleged in this count of the complaint that the seller forced him to
overhaul the tractor at a cost of $598.37.
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rationale dearly. Adams has done little to clear up the confusion
in the case law that currently exists on the subject of the allowance
of consequential damages under the UCC when such damages are
specifically excluded in a written contract.
Examples of this confusion are found in prior cases where
limited remedies similar to those in Adams were contemplated. In
Cox Motor Car Co. v. Castle,8 a purchaser of a truck was allowed
direct damages for breach of an express warranty, but consequen-
tial damages for loss of use were found inappropriate because they
were excluded in the written contract. Consequential damages
should have been allowed because the implied warranty of mer-
chantability was not expressly excluded.19
A California court of appeals in Gherna v. Ford Motor Co.,"0
found that an automobile warranty given by a commercial seller to
a private consumer, which had limitation provisions similar to the
ones in Adams,2 should be strictly construed against the seller and
should not negate any implied warranties, the breach of which
would trigger additional remedies.22 The decision emphasized the
unequal bargaining position of the parties. Rather than fully and
freely reaching a mutual accord on the provisions of the contract,
the limitations were forced upon the buyer by the seller. In Neville
Chemical Co. v. Union Carbide Corp.,2' however, a case involving
two large commercial parties, the limitations and exclusions were
also construed against the seller because of the policy of the UCC
favoring strict construction of exculpatory clauses. Thus, the exist-
ence of unequal bargaining positions does not necessarily determine
how the exclusions will be interpreted.
In Seely v. White Motor Co.,24 a manufacturer breached his ex-
press warranty to repair. Damages for commercial losses were al-
lowed, in spite of the limiting language of the written warranty,
because they naturally resulted from the breach. The facts of this
case are similar to those in Adams, because the purchaser was a com-
18402 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966).
19 See W. WILLIER & F. HART, UCC REPORTER-DIGEST CASE ANNOTATIONS §
2-316, at 2-358 (Matthew Bender & Co. ed. 1970); text accompanying notes 12-14
supra.
20 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (Dist. C. App. 1966).
21 See text accompanying note 2 supra.
2 2 Because the warranty in Gherna arose in 1957, the parties were governed by the
Uniform Sales Act. The court relied, however, on cases decided under the UCC, and
it is safe to assume that the result would have been the same under the UCC.
23 422 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1970).
24 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
LIMITATION OF REMEDIES
mercial party and the seller was given several months in which to
complete the repairs before suit for damages was instituted.
The unifying factor of these last three decisions is that the sell-
ers were held liable for breaches of warranties given to buyers, and
damages in excess of the limited, exclusive remedy agreed upon
were imposed. Each of these courts, however, reached its result
through different reasoning. The opinion in Adams will only add
to the uncertainty of how these breach of warranty cases should be
decided under the UCC.
Although the facts necessary to establish the failure of an exclu-
sive remedy under section 2-719(2) of the UCC will vary with each
case, the factual situation which led to the decision in Adams is in-
structive. If the remedy of repairs is to be of value to the buyer, and
therefore a valid exclusive remedy under the UCC, sellers must ac-
cept the responsibility of performance within a reasonable time.
The opinion in Adams indicates that the court was influenced by
the absence of a good faith effort by the seller to complete the re-
pairs. If a good faith effort had been made, the seller might have
avoided a finding of consequential damages, even if he had been un-
able to make the repairs within a reasonable time.
Commercial sellers must not assume that the specific exclusion of
consequential damages in a warranty will be honored despite the
seller's breach of the exclusive remedy provisions. Courts such as
Adams have been quite willing to state that the exclusion of conse-
quential damages will be valid only insofar as the parties honor their
exclusive remedy provisions. Once the exclusive remedy fails in its
essential purpose, the full measure of both direct and consequential
damages may be available to the buyer. One possible way for the
commercial seller to avoid this unexpected liability would be, instead
of disclaiming all consequential damages, to limit the amount of con-
sequential damages to a specified amount. This kind of provision
would be a dear indication to the courts that the possible failure of
the exclusive remedy was contemplated by the parties, and, so long
as it is not unconscionable, such a provision would be within the
policy of the UCC to allow commercial parties freedom in forming
their own contracts.25
25 See UCC § 1-102(3).
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